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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a general equilibrium model that extends a static New Keynesian 
framework to an overlapping generations (OLG) model. The model shows multiple 
stationary states, one of which has the following strong Keynesian features: (1) a 
reduction in wages generates increased unemployment through a decrease in 
consumption and (2) the fiscal multiplier is larger than unity and is increasing in the 
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  11. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a recent book and a paper, De Vroey (2004, 2005) appropriately summarizes 
Keynes’s programme as follows: 
1) demonstrating the existence of involuntary unemployment, 
2) demonstrating that wage rigidity can be exonerated as its cause, 
3) giving a general equilibrium or interdependency explanation for the 
phenomenon, 
4) demonstrating that demand stimulation is the proper remedy for the problem. 
Subsequently, assessing the various ‘old’ and ‘new’ Keynesian models, De Vroey 
concludes that none of the models fully succeed in achieving the above programme. 
This paper presents a model in which the above-mentioned four criteria are satisfied 
in one of stationary states. 
      The present model is a natural extension of a static New Keynesian framework to 
an OLG framework.
1 This model incorporates the following three elements: (1) a 
shirking type of efficiency wage, (2) an overlapping generations (OLG) framework 
and (3) monopolistic competition. As is commonly found in the literature on 
efficiency wage, one of the outcomes of the present model is that wages are not 
market clearing.
2 However, there is a significant difference between the preceding 
efficiency wage arguments and the argument developed below. In the preceding 
                                                 
1 For static New Keynesian models, see Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Startz (1989), 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Dixon (1987, 1990) and Bénassy (1995). In particular, 
Dixon (1990) and the current paper share the common property of a rigid nominal 
wage, which is a constant mark-up over an unemployment insurance payment.   
2 See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). 
  2models, the cause of involuntary unemployment is the excessively high wages that are 
set to prevent workers from shirking; therefore, a reduction in these wages results in 
reducing unemployment. In contrast, the present model shows that unemployment in a 
stationary state is caused by an insufficient demand for outputs; accordingly, a 
reduction in wages results in an increase in unemployment through a decrease in 
consumption. This result implies that if the pressure of unemployment reduces wages, 
unemployment may increase, and that unemployment cannot be attributed to wage 
rigidity. 
   The model presented below also shows the effectiveness of demand stimulation 
by fiscal policy. In the preceding literature, a fiscal multiplier is less than unity and is 
decreasing in the wage share in income.
3 On the other hand, in the present model, the 





This section presents a simple model for formulating the behaviours of firms and 
workers in four stages. Firms make managerial plans that include elements such as 
how many workers to employ, how much to produce and at what level to set the 
wages and prices. Workers, the number of whom is normalized to unity, are born 
every period, and each worker lives for two periods. In the first period, workers obtain 
wages if they are employed and not dismissed. Otherwise, they receive 
unemployment insurance payments. Since firms are only able to monitor their 
                                                 
3 See Dixon (1987), Mankiw (1988), Startz (1989), Molana and Moutos (1992) and 
Bénassy (1995). 
  3workers incompletely, workers, if employed, can choose their own efficiency levels. 
Workers can carry over their revenues, in the form of money and equities, into the 
next period and spend it all on consumption. Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of 
these events. The decision-making processes are solved by backward induction.   
 
2.1 Stage 4: Consumption at period t + 1 
 
According to the settings of monopolistic competition,
4 worker j at period t  + 1 
spends all of his/her equities and money on each type of consumption goods in order 
to maximize the consumption index 
1 1
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t , subject to the budget 
constraint  , where   denotes  the 
amount of consumption goods i,   is the price of the consumption goods i, 
 is the dividend,   is the equity price,   is the amount of equities and 
 is the amount of money. As a result, the demand of worker j for consumption 






t i t i M E S D di C P + + = + + + + ∫ ) ( 1 1
1
0 1 , 1 ,
j
t i C 1 , +
1 , + t i P











j)/Pt+1 [ ],             ( 1 )  
where   denotes the price index given by  1 + t P Pt+1 ≡ Pi,t+1
1−η di
0
1 ∫ [ ]
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1−η. And then we 
obtain the following: 
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  Through these activities, worker j obtains utility. It is assumed that utility can be 
expressed by the function U(C, M/PC). The utility depends not only on consumption 
                                                 
4 See Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). 
  4but also on the ratio of money to the amount of spending, because a high money ratio, 
i.e. a high liquidity ratio, will reduce the efforts needed for purchasing consumption 
goods.
5  For simplicity, the utility function is specified as 
, in which the marginal utility of the liquidity ratio 
diminishes faster than that of intrinsic consumption. Thus, the utility of worker j at 
Stage 4 is as follows:
α − ≡ 1 ) / ( log ) / , ( PC M C PC M C U
6




t t j P M C U α α
 
2.2 Stage 3: Choice between money and equities at period t 
 
Equation (2) can be rewritten in the following manner: 
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where   represents the interest rate of equities, and 
 is the amount of income at period t. Note that the amount of 
income    is already determined during Stages 1 and 2. At this point, the proportion 
of money and equities to income is determined by household j. The problem at Stage 
3 is therefore formalized as follows: 
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5 Feenstra (1986) discusses the equivalence of the money in utility approach and the 
transaction cost approach. 
6 In Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the utility function is assumed to be linear.   
  5From the first-order condition, we have the following: 
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As a result, the consumption index and utility at period t + 1 are, respectively, as 
follows: 
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2.3 Stage 2: Determination of efficiency at work 
 
Let W denote nominal wages; V, unemployment insurance payments for a dismissed 
worker, and τ , premium rates of insurance. The net income of employee j,  , is 
j
t I
(1−τt)Wt if the employee is not dismissed and  t t V ) 1 ( τ −  if he/she is dismissed.
7 
Accordingly, from (7), the utilities of a wage earner and of a non-wage earner are, 
respectively, as follows: 
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For an employee, the utility expected at period t is given by
8
                                                 
7 To simplify the analysis, V is defined as a gross payment. Paying some lower 
amount of wages to dismissed workers might be more realistic, but it would 
complicate the analysis. Furthermore, in our model, firms do not have any incentive 
to pay a part of full wages to dismissed workers. 
8 Subscripts are abbreviated where it does not lead to any confusion. 
  6       ,                        ( 1 0 )   ) ))( ( 1 ( ) )( ( e U e e U e EU v w δ β δ β − − + − ≡
where e denotes the efficiency at work, and  δ (> 0) is the marginal disutility of e. 
Efficiency  e is normalized to unity under no shirking. Function  ) (e β  yields the 
probability of no dismissal and reflects incomplete monitoring. Appendix 1 provides 
the derivation of  ) (e β . As shown in Figure 2, function  ) (e β  can be characterized 
by an S-shape, i.e.  0 ) ( ' ≥ e β   for all values of e and  0 ) ( " ≤ e β   for a right side range 
of e. 
   The employed worker will decide efficiency level e in order to maximize the 
expected utility given by (10).
9 The first-order condition is as follows: 
       0 ) / log( ) ( ' = −δ β V W e .                          ( 1 1 )  
Then, from (11), we obtain 
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β ,                     ( 1 2 )  
which shows that efficiency increases with a rise in nominal wages. While an increase 
in efficiency enhances disutility, it reduces the probability of dismissal. In these 
circumstances, as has been described in the literature on efficiency wages, if a firm 
pays a higher wage to its workers, the workers will perceive that the opportunity cost 
of being dismissed is increasing; accordingly, they will select a higher efficiency, with 
the purpose of avoiding dismissal.   
 
2.4 Stage 1: Firm’s behaviour 
 
                                                 
9 Due to the two-period OLG structure, there is no opportunity for the dismissed 
workers to be re-hired. This assumption simplifies the analysis by allowing workers to 
determine e, independent of employment rates. 
  7Let us assume identical and monopolistically competitive firms, the number of which 
is normalized to unity. Each firm is constrained by the following production and 
demand functions: 
       i i eL Y = ,                                    ( 1 3 )  
       () Y P P Y i i
η − = / ,     ( 1 > η ）,                     ( 1 4 )  
where   denotes the output of firm i,   is the number of workers employed by 
firm i,   is the output price of firm i and Y is the aggregate real expenditure.
i Y i L
i P
10 
Taking (13) and (14) into account, the firm will maximize its profit Π  in the 
following manner: 
i
       i
i
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where   is the nominal wage in firm i. The firm will determine   in order to 
minimize the unit cost 
i W i W
) / ( e Wiβ  or to maximize ) /( β i W e . The first-order condition 
is 
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which implies that the Solow condition is modified due to  ) (e β . With regard to  , 
the firm will mark-up the unit cost 
i P
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where  )) 1 /( ( / 1 − ≡ η η θ  represents a mark-up ratio. It should be noted that  θ  also 
implies the wage share in income; this is because  θ β = PY L W / .  
 
                                                 
10 Equation (14) is consistent with equations (1), (17) and (18). 
  82.5 Government and insurance system 
 
The government minimizes discretionary spending  , subject to  ∫
1
0 di G P i i

















.  G denotes the index value to be attained, and   is the 
amount of consumption goods i that the government consumes. As a result, the 
government’s demand for consumption goods i is given by 
i G
  .                                  ( 1 7 )   () G P P G i i
η − = /
For simplicity, let us assume that government spending is financed by corporation tax 
T as follows:
11
  .                             ( 1 8 )   T PG di G P i i = = ∫
1
0
Consequently, the dividends on equities will be represented by the following after-tax 
profits:  . Π−T
12 In order to focus on the demand effect of G, it is assumed that G 
does not have any direct effect on the utility and production functions (i.e. a complete 
waste). 
   Let us assume that the budget for unemployment insurance is independent of the 
government’s tax system. The budget constraint in the insurance system can be 
represented as follows: 
       ) 1 ( ) 1 ( L V L W L V β τ β τ β − + = − ,                               ( 1 9 )  
where the premium rate of insurance τ  is an endogenous variable. The left- and 
                                                 
11 Since a comparison between the different tax schemes is not the focus of this study, 
a corporation tax—one that is convenient for analysis—is adopted. 
12 See footnote 20. 
  9right-hand sides of (19) are payments from and revenues into the insurance system, 





This section examines equilibrium in each market. Firstly, we identify the nominal 
wage and efficiency in equilibrium. Secondly, we specify equilibria in the markets for 
outputs and money. Finally, by integrating these results, we examine the dynamics 
and stationary states with regard to outputs. 
 
3.1 Nominal wage and efficiency 
 
By introducing (12) into (15), we obtain the following: 
       2 1 / ) 1 ( ) / log( ε ε − = V W ,                                    ( 2 0 )  
where  β β ε / ' 1 e ≡  and  ' / " 2 β β ε e − ≡ . Once the level of unemployment insurance V 
is set, efficiency e and nominal wage W are determined in (11) and (20).
13 Equation 
(11) implies that firms will never reduce the nominal wage to the level of 
unemployment insurance even if there are many unemployed workers who could be 
useful to the firms for replacing current employees. Further, as far as an internal 
solution holds with respect to e, we obtain the following: 
       .          ( 2 1 )  
v v v w v v w U U U U e U U U e EU > + − > − + − = ) )( 0 ( ) )( ( β δ β
                                                 
13 Appendix 2 provides a numerical example of (11) and (20) only for the purpose of 
confirming the existence of a meaningful e and W. 
  10The expected utility of an employed worker is higher than that of an unemployed 
worker. Unemployed workers hope to acquire jobs at the current wage (or even a 
lower wage). However, firms neither reduce wages nor hire additional workers. Hence, 
the unemployment occurring in this case is involuntary.
14  
   From (11) and (20), it is evident that an increase in V results in a proportional 
increase in W, without affecting e and  ) (e β . However, as shown later, an increase in 
V can have a positive effect on aggregate demand and employment. 
 
3.2 Output and money markets 
 
The following indicates equilibrium in the output market: 
       PG L V R L W R PY t t t t t t t + − − + + − + = + + + ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 1 1 β τ α β τ α .         ( 2 2 )  
The first and second terms in the right-hand side of (22) represent the consumption of 
wage earners and non-wage earners, respectively. By taking into account (13), (16) 
and (19), (22) can be represented as follows: 
       G Y R Y t t t + + = + + θ α ) 1 ( 1 1 .                                   ( 2 3 )  
      The money market equilibrium is given by 
       ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
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where  M   is a given amount of money.
15 The first and second terms in the right-hand 
                                                 
14 If the insurance payment for an unemployed worker is much higher than that for a 
dismissed worker, unemployment could be voluntary.   
15 It is assumed that the amount of  M   was issued in the past activities of the 
government and that thereafter  M   has passed from one generation to another 
through transactions in markets. 
  11side of (24) represent the money demand of wage earners and non-wage earners, 
respectively. Again, considering (13), (16) and (19), the above-mentioned equation 
(24) can be represented as follows: 
      m =
1+ Rt+1
Rt+1
(1−α)θYt,                                       ( 2 5 )  
where  m ≡ M /P is the real money balance. The pair of equations (23) and (25) 
specifies the dynamics of Y and R.   
 
3.3 Equilibrium dynamics and stationary states 
 
From (23) and (25), we obtain the following difference equation that characterizes the 
equilibrium dynamics of Y: 








= + θ α
αθ
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1 .                                     ( 2 6 )  
The curve in Figure 3 depicts (26) and is convex downward. This is because the 
interest rate    in (25) increases with  , i.e. the higher the income, the greater is 
the money demand and the higher is the interest rate. Figure 3 shows that two 
stationary states can exist in this system.
1 + t R t Y
16 The necessary and sufficient condition for 
two stationary states is as follows:
17
                                                 
16 In an OLG model with fixed prices, Madden (1992) shows two temporary 
equilibria that are similar to the ones in this study. Based on an efficiency wage 
mechanism, the current paper provides an explicit explanation of why nominal wages 
(and thereby prices) do not fall despite the existence of unemployment. 
17 Inequality (27) can be derived from the discriminant of a quadratic equation, into 
which (26) is transferred.   
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Since an increase in G shifts the curve in Figure 3 upwards, it can be stated that for 
stationary states to exist, G must lie within a limited range.   
   The fraction in (26) indicates consumption, and the marginal propensity to 
consume is smaller than unity at point K, although it is larger than unity at point N. 
While stationary state K is stable, stationary state N is unstable; as long as the initial 
value   falls within the range  , the path of Y is non-divergent. In this 
range, any initial value of    is consistent with perfect foresight.
0 Y
∗ ∗ ≤ ≤ Y Y0 0
0 Y
18 Therefore, in the 
short run, output levels are indeterminate. In the long run, however, output levels 
converge to 
∗ Y , with the exception of the case of  . Notice that Y is an 
aggregate variable, which no single agent can control. Accordingly, without 
coordination, there is no guarantee that agents behave according to the expectation 
that 
∗ ∗ =Y Y0
Y0 =Y **. For instance, if every agent believes that  Y0 =Y *, the situation where 
each firm maximizes its profit with making Yi  equal to  * Y  is consistent with 
perfect foresight. Thus, we cannot eliminate the possibility that coordination failure 




                                                 
18 If G = 0, stationary state K disappears. In this case, however, the path that starts 
from a positive  Y0(<Y
∗∗)  and converges to zero would remain consistent with both 
perfect foresight and individual optimization. Therefore, making government 
spending zero does not guarantee that  . 
∗ ∗ =Y Y0
19 For coordination failure, see Cooper and John (1988) and Cooper (1999). 
  134. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
This section develops comparative statics concerning nominal wages, unemployment 
insurance and government spending. Since stationary state K is stable while stationary 
state  N is unstable, the correspondence principle indicates that the result of 
comparative statics at stationary state N is just the opposite of that at stationary state K. 
Our main concern is for the economy trapped at lower levels of output, and hence the 
focus of this section is on the characteristics of stationary state K.
20  
 
4.1 GS-LM diagram 
 
Firstly, as a useful tool for analysis, the GS-LM diagram is presented. In the analogy 
of the IS-LM diagram, let two curves represent the equilibria in output and money 
markets. Equations (23) and (25) can be rewritten as follows:
21
       Y R G ) ) 1 ( 1 ( θ α + − = ,                                      ( 2 8 )  
      
1+ R
R
(1−α)θY = m.                                      ( 2 9 )  
In Figure 4, (28) is drawn as a GS curve, indicating that government spending is equal 
to savings. Equation (29) is drawn as a LM curve, indicating that the money demand 
(liquidity preference) is equal to the money supply.
22 Note that the GS curve always 
                                                 
20 While the characteristics of stationary state N might be familiar, those of stationary 
state K would not. This is also one of reasons why stationary state K is worth 
examining. 
21 We consider the case where  1 / < = e Y L   under sufficiently small G and m. 
22 Taking into account PG = T,  ) ( ) 1 ( M PY R T PY − = − − θ θ   is derived from (28) 
  14has a positive slope because consumption increases with increasing interest rates. 
Point K in Figure 4 corresponds to point K in Figure 3. 
 
4.2 Nominal wage and unemployment 
 
Let us examine the case in which an increase in insurance payment V results in a 
proportional increase in nominal wage W (see (11) and (20)). This increase in W 
enhances price P  proportionally (see (16)). Therefore, real wage W/P and real 
insurance payment V/P remain constant; however, the real money balance m  is 
reduced. Responding to the decrease in m, the LM curve shifts upwards, as in a typical 
IS-LM exercise. Then,   and R* in Figure 4 are enhanced. Thus, together with an 
increase in W, aggregate demand and employment will increase. Unemployment 
cannot be attributed to high nominal wages. This finding is contradictory to the results 
typically obtained in the literature, including Dixon (1990) and others. The reason 
why the real balance effect does not work is intuitively explained as follows. In the 
OLG framework without bequests, the primary asset of each household is labour 
endowments. Using labour endowments in the first period, households earn wage 
income and save it in the form of money and equities. In the second period, they 
spend the entire amount. Now, let us suppose that nominal wages are reduced. The 
output prices are reduced through a mark-up mechanism, and accordingly, the real 
money balance increases. However, the total asset value does not necessarily increase 
because a decrease in equity values can negate an increase in the real money balance. 
Further, the lower interest rates resulting from an increased real money balance 
diminish the purchasing power of households in the second period. Thus, 
* Y
                                                                                                                                            
and (29), i.e. the after-tax profit of firms equals the net return on equities. 
  15consumption decreases despite the increase in real money balance. 
 
4.3 Unemployment insurance and welfare 
 
Now, let us examine how an increase in V affects individual utility. Firstly, an increase 
in V affects the utilities in (8) and (9) through an increase in interest rates; however, 
the effect of the increased interest rate is ambiguous because it works in two opposite 
directions. On the one hand, an increase in interest rates allows the workers to 
consume more as a result of a greater return from equities. However, on the other 
hand, an increase in interest rates leads to a higher cost of money holdings, inducing 
workers to reduce money holdings. Considering (29), it is found that 
               0











Since the positive demand for equities requires that aggregate real wage θY is 
greater than real money balance m, it must hold in equilibrium that  θY > m.
23 Thus, 
an increase in V enhances utilities through an increase in interest rates. 
   Secondly, since employment is increasing in V, individual workers always obtain 
a certain gain from a lower premium rate  τ .
24 Thirdly, since the expected utility of an 
employed worker is greater than that of an unemployed worker, additional 
employment is a positive factor in ex ante utility. Thus, it is concluded that an 
increase in V is Pareto-improving in an ex ante sense.   
                                                 
23 For the last inequality to hold, we have to assume that  G > (1−θ)m/θ. The 
right-hand side of this inequality is derived by setting  Yt+1 =Yt =Y = m/θ  in (26) and 
solving for G. 
24 From (19), it is confirmed that  τ   is decreasing in L (note that W > V). 
  16   An  increase  in  V enhances the ex post utility of those workers with an unchanging 
employment status; however, a newly employed worker who is eventually dismissed 
will suffer a discontinuous amount of  e δ   loss in ex post utility. 
 
4.4 Fiscal policy 
 
Let us now examine the effect of G in terms of its multiplier. Let   denote the 
marginal propensity to consume. Noting that 
c
) ) 1 ( /( Y m Y m C θ α θ α − − =  and 
) ) 1 ( /( 1 Y m m R θ α − − = + , the marginal propensity to consume can be expressed as 
, which is smaller than unity at stationary state K.
2 ) 1 ( R c + =αθ
25 From (26), we 
obtain the following multiplier that can be found in Keynesian textbooks: 
       ) 1 /( 1 / c dG dY − = .                        ( 3 0 )  
      The above result is similar to that of Dixon (1987), Mankiw (1988), Starts (1989), 
Molana and Moutos (1991) and Bénassy (1995); however, while their multiplier 
decreases with the wage share in income, the multiplier in this study increases along 
with the wage share. This is because  0 / > ∂ ∂ θ c .
26 Hence, the current model may be 




                                                 
25 Unlike its usual definition, c includes the effect of a change in R as well as the 
direct effect of Y on consumption. 
26 From a GS-LM exercise in Figure 4, it is easy to observe that R is increasing in  θ. 
27 Bénassy (2007) recently presents a model where the multiplier is greater than unity. 
However, his multiplier is not the balanced budget one. 
  175. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper presents a simple, but carefully micro-founded, general equilibrium model, 
which consists of the following familiar elements: efficiency wage, monopolistic 
competition and OLG structure. While each element is orthodox, the unemployment 
occurring in a low level stationary state should be understood not as a consequence of 
high wages but as that of an insufficient demand for outputs. Further, the model yields 
the following policy implication: For this type of unemployment, it is desirable to 
enhance unemployment insurance which supports wages and thereby prevents further 
reduction in aggregate demand. Combined with relatively high levels of government 
spending, this can lead to a Pareto improvement. 
   Since the model presented is specific, the above-stated conclusion should be 
cautiously dealt with in practical application. However, it does suggest that the 
achievement of Keynes’s programme is in fact possible. 
 
 
APPENDIX 1: DERIVATION OF  ) (e β  
 
Let us divide one period into Z sub-periods, where Z is assumed to be sufficiently 
large. Assume that a worker has the following two choices in each sub-period: to shirk 
or not to shirk. Further, assume that if a worker is shirking at a sub-period, the 
probability of its detection is exogenously given by q, which is less than unity because 
of imperfect monitoring. Moreover, assume that due to the difficulty in verification, a 
firm can dismiss a worker only if it detects the worker shirking more than  k  times. 
If S denotes the number of sub-periods where a worker is shirking, the probability 
  18distribution of detection k times is given by the following binomial distribution:
28  
      
k S k q q
k S k
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S k P − −
−
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) ( .                              ( A - 1 )  
Figure 5 draws (A-1) as a continuous curve. From (A-1), the probability of being 
dismissed is obtained as follows: 








∑ ,                              ( A - 2 )  
which is drawn in Figure 6. Let us now define the efficiency as  Z S Z e / ) ( − ≡ . Then, 
noting that S = Z(1-e),  )) 1 ( ( 1 ) ( e Z P e − − ≡ β   is obtained, as drawn in Figure 2. 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF (11) AND (20) 
 
In Figure 7, the reversed U-shape line and the second line depict the right-hand side 
of (20) and that of the following equation, respectively: 
       ) ( ' / ) / log( e V W β δ = ,                                     ( 1 1 ’ )  
where the parameter values are  4 = k , q = 0.1, Z = 105 and  005 . 0 = δ . Although 
these lines intersect at two points, only the right-hand point in Figure 7 satisfies the 
second-order condition in the firm’s decision.   
                                                 
28 For example, see Eric W. Weisstein, ‘Binomial Distribution’, from MathWorld—A 
Wolfram Web Resource. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BinomialDistribution.html.  
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Figure 1. Flowchart of decisions. 
 





Figure 2. Function  ) (e β .




















1 + t Y
∗ ∗ Y
∗ Y




Figure 3. Dynamics of Y. 
































Figure 4. GS-LM diagram. 
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Figure 5. Binomial distribution  ) ( S k P ; S = 100, q = 0.1.
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Figure 6. Function P(S);  4 = k , q = 0.1. 
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Figure 7. A numerical example of (11’) and (20);  4 = k , q = 0.1, Z = 105, 
005 . 0 = δ . 
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